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The formation of Russian postmodernist thought can be traced to the theoretical works of
Andrei Siniavsky, in particular to his treatise ‘‘On Socialist Realism’’ (1959). Instead of
praising socialist realism as the ‘‘truthful reﬂection of life’’ (as did ofﬁcial Soviet criticism),
or condemning it as a ‘‘distortion of reality and poor ideologized art’’ (as did dissident and
liberal Western criticism), Siniavsky suggested the artistic utilization of the signs and
images of socialist realism, while introducing a playful distance from their ideological
content. This project was realized in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of Sots-Art and
Conceptualism, inﬂuential artistic and intellectual movements that transformed the Soviet
ideological system into material for parody and pastiche, often characterized also by
a lyrical and nostalgic attitude.
Conceptualism is notmerely an artistic trend; its philosophical signiﬁcance is revealed in the
art and programmic statements of Ilya Kabakov andVitaly Komar andAleksandrMelamid, in
Alexander Zinoviev’s ﬁction, in Dmitry Prigov’s poetry, articles and manifestos, and in Boris
Groys’s theoretical works. As a philosophy, Conceptualism presupposes that any system of
thought is self-enclosed and has no correspondence with reality. The relationship between
Conceptualism and Marxism is somewhat reminiscent of the dispute between nominalists
(whose moderate version was also called ‘‘conceptualism’’) and realists in the epoch of the
Medieval scholastics: whereas Marxists assert the historical reality of such concepts as
collectivism, equality, and freedom, Conceptualists demonstrate that all these notions are
contingent on mental structures or derived from linguistic structures.
Therefore, from a Conceptualist standpoint, a ‘‘concept’’ is any idea–political, religious,
moral–presented as an idea, without any reference to its real prototype or the possibility of
realization. That is why Conceptualism, as a philosophy, is so strongly connected with art:
the idea is used in its aesthetic capacity, as a verbal statement or visual projection of idea
as such, so that all its factual or practical extensions are revealed as delusions. For example,
conceptualists view totalitarian thinking, with its claims of all-encompassing truthfulness,
as a kind of madness: a network of self-referential signs and internal consistencies
forcefully imposed on external reality. When considering more properly philosophical
ideas, Conceptualism creates parodies of metaphysical discourse, using, for example,
Hegelian or Kantian rhetorical models for the description of such trivial objects as ﬂies or
garbage. This is not merely an attempt at the ironic deconstruction of traditional philos-
ophy–it is also a project for the proliferation of new, multiple metaphysics, each of whichResearch Center, Hanyang University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer review under
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Hegel or a ﬂy in Kabakov. Postmodernism is often criticized for its aestheticism and moral
indifference, but Russian conceptualists emphasize the moral implications of metaphysical
contingency, which undermines totalitarian and hegemonic discourse and promotes self-
irony as a mode of humility.
Conceptualism identiﬁes itself as a predominantly Russian-Soviet mode of thinking. In the
West, the correlation between ideological signs and observable reality has been persis-
tently validated through scientiﬁc and economic practice; while in Russia, traditionally,
reality itself has been constructed from ideological signs generated by its ruling minds as
a kind of hyper-reality. Thus, Russian Conceptualism sees itself not as a mere replica of
Western postmodernism, but as a reﬂection of the underlying structures of Russian history,
where the signs of reality have always been subject to ideological manipulation.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.In recent years the concept of postmodernism has often
been deployed to explain the peculiarities of late Soviet and
post-Soviet culture, such as the post-Utopian mentality,
a critical attitude towards traditional notions of reality, and
ironic playfulnesswith regard to the sign systems of various
ideologies.1 In Russia, the literary and artistic movement
most directly related to Western postmodernism became
famousunder thename ‘‘conceptualism.’’ Initially, the name
was borrowed from the Western artistic school founded in
the late 1960s by Joseph Kosuth. Conceptual art from the
very beginning was connected with philosophy and even
claimed tobemoregenuinelyphilosophical thanphilosophy
itself. ‘‘The twentieth century brought in a timewhich could
be called ‘the end of philosophy and the beginning of art.’
[.] Art is itself philosophy made concrete’’ (Kosuth, 1991,
pp.14, 52). Two linesof argument intersect in this statement.
On the one hand, 20th century art is no more limited to the
creation of material forms but starts to question the very
nature of art and redeﬁne it with each speciﬁc work. Art,
therefore, becomes an articulation of the ideas about art.
‘‘.‘Conceptual Art’ merely means a conceptual investiga-
tionof art’’ (Kosuth,1991p. 84).On theotherhand, analytical
philosophy, as Kosuth proposes, has refuted any claims of
philosophy to enunciate the truth, to make veritable prop-
ositions about the world. Therefore, philosophy has lost its
privileged ‘‘scientiﬁc’’ status; in ‘‘post-philosophical’’ age, its
function passes to art which plays with signs and languages
without any assumption of their credibility.
These two processes, the conceptualization of art and
the aesthetization of philosophy, contribute together into
their rapprochement and the redeﬁnition of conceptual art
as concrete philosophy. Instead of portraying a visible
object, the conceptualist artist presents its verbal descrip-
tion, that is, a deliberately schematized generalization
takes the place of a lifelike image. This device broke ground
for metaphysical speculation about the nature of artistic
reality as the mere projection of mental forms. Russian
culture proved to be a fertile ground for the application of
conceptualist theory, owing to the prevalence of ideologicalstmodernism’’ (with
e McGann, Marjorie
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al, 1995, Vol. 39, No. 2schemes and stereotypes throughout its history, especially
during the Soviet period.
Another source of the term ‘‘conceptualism,’’ less
evident but perhaps more signiﬁcant for the development
of the movement in Russia, is the medieval philosophical
school of the same name. Among the European scholastics
of the 13th and 14th centuries, conceptualism functioned
as a moderate version of nominalism, which asserted that
all general ideas have their being not in reality itself but in
the sphere of pure concepts. As such, this school was
opposed to realism, which posited one continuum of
physical and conceptual reality and insisted on ontological
being of such universals as love, soul, goodness, etc.
Strange as it may seem, an analogous confrontation of two
intellectual trends occurred in the late Soviet period, with
Marxism asserting the historical reality of such general
ideas as ‘‘collectivism,’’ ‘‘equality,’’ ‘‘progress,’’ and
conceptualism arguing the purely nominative and mental
basis of such ideological constructions. Like its medieval
counterpart, conceptualism attempts to expose the real-
istic fallacy that attributes objective existence to general or
abstract ideas. This was the hidden assumption of the
Soviet system: it gave the status of absolute reality to its
own ideological pronouncements. Virtually every facet of
Soviet life was dictated by ideological presuppositions
about the nature of social reality, and conceptualism
attempted to expose the contingent nature of such
concepts by unmasking them as constructions proceeding
from the human mind or generated by linguistic practices.
TheRussianversion of conceptualism,whichﬂourished in
the 1970s and 1980s, established a theoretical distance
toward the multiplicity of discourses that dominated Soviet
culture. From the start, conceptualism was not a purely
artistic movement, but relied heavily on a philosophical
foundation. Conceptualist poetry and visual art are theoreti-
cally self-conscious, presuming a premeditated and ironic
attitude toward the language of ideas. Conceptualism might
be called a meta-ideological approach to arts, or, meta-
aesthetic approach to ideology, since it strives to reﬂect upon
the hidden ideological apriorisms of consciousness and to
verbalize or visualize them. Since ideological stereotyping
unconsciously pre-conditions our thinking, conceptualists
propose to undermine this process of indoctrination by
revealing it to consciousness. In a sense, conceptualism
worked as a psychoanalytic instrument for deconstructing
the repressive Soviet superego. If psychoanalysis involves
2 This term was introduced by Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid,
see section of this chapter.
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individual consciousness, the conceptualist project was an
‘‘ideo-analysis’’whichaimed tocure the traumaof ideological
obsessions by bringing them to the awareness of the collec-
tive subject.
Many Russian thinkers in the conceptualist trend are
not philosophers in the conventional sense; rather they are
the members of an artistic school, or its interpreters, or
both. In this they are radically different from all the tradi-
tional schools of thought which relied solely upon
linguistic discourse for the presentation of ideas. With its
visual component, conceptualism overcomes the long-
standing afﬁliation between philosophy and literature in
Russia, and also contrasts with the Western bias for
philosophy couched almost exclusively in oral or written
discourse. This conventional bias went unquestioned for
centuries, but with the advent of conceptualism we are
ﬁnally prompted to wonder: why is philosophy obliged to
be verbal? Why cannot it take visual or gestural form? The
presupposition of conceptual art is, simply, that art may be
practiced in the medium of conceptions, or mental
projections; is not this precisely what philosophy is as
well? Conceptual artists do not so much deal with visual
forms per se, as with visualizations of concepts that
constitute a kind of philosophical discourse translated into
a system of objects and presented as works of art.
On the other hand, conceptual art problematizes not
only the linguistic bias of philosophy but also the visual
bias of the arts. The basis of conceptualism is a critique of
pure representation, in the Kantian sense. For Kant, an
intelligible essence does not belong to the thing-in-itself
but is imposed on it through the a priori schemes of
consciousness. Similarly, the visual element in art can be
understood as only a projection of constructive imagina-
tion – an interpretation that regards the visual realm
generally as an extension of a concept, while the concept
itself can supplement or substitute for a picture or an
image. This was done literally in the early works of
Western conceptualism, where, for example, an encyclo-
pedia article describing a chair was presented as an artistic
object along with the chair itself and its reproduction in
painting (Joseph Kosuth’s ‘‘One and Three Chairs’’, 1965,
The Museum of Modern Art, New York). Traditionally, the
visual component is privileged over the label, or verbal
inscription, that accompanies and designates an autono-
mous work of art. In conceptual art, the textual component
moves into the foreground; every visual work is conceived
as an illustration of its label, of the artist’s textual crea-
tivity. At the same time, a conceptual work is not merely
an artistic illustration of a text, like in a book, where the
visual is dependent on and subordinate to the literary
narrative, and reproduces the plot; in conceptual art, a text
itself functions as a visual work or interacts independently
and creatively with a visual image. Moreover, a conceptu-
alist does not even need to create a new artifact to label
and sign, but can afﬁx a title or signature to an existing
real-world object, thereby transforming it into a concept.
Thus Russian conceptualist artists Komar and Melamid
‘‘signed’’ an earthquake that occurred in Germany and sent
a telegram to the Chancellor notifying him that they were
the authors of the event. This mode allows a conceptualistto create concepts out of anything whatsoever, making this
artistic practice a bona ﬁde philosophical activity, inas-
much as it carries out the conceptualization of the world.
Conceptualist thinking reveals the futile aggressiveness
of the human mind, which imposes its own ideological
schemes on a reality that is inaccessible as such, and yet is
continually pursued via a process of representational
substitutions and innumerable references without veriﬁ-
able referents. In this view, any attempt at mental coher-
ency is essentially madness, if we deﬁne the latter as
the state of consciousness isolated from reality. From
the conceptualist standpoint, traditional philosophy, as the
most rigorously coherent way of thinking, is closest to
madness, with its solipsistic ﬁxations on absolute ideas.
The only way to distinguish philosophy from madness is
the self-irony of the philosopher; thus, in conceptualism,
irony takes the place occupied by truth or veriﬁcation in
more ambitious philosophical systems, like German
idealism or logical positivism. The method for relating
philosophy to reality now involves not the positive corre-
spondence or identiﬁcation of thoughts and objects, but the
revelation of an inexorable and irreducible disjunction
between them, a gap bridged only by self-referential and
therefore self-ironic conceptualizations. Irony becomes the
only possible form of truth for conceptual philosophy,
inasmuch as it lacks any criteria for veriﬁcation but has
innumerable criteria for philosophical self-falsiﬁcation.
Conceptualism offers a radical challenge to totalitarian
claims of absolute truth, to the kind of ideological madness
that prescribes ideas for the interpretation and trans-
formation of reality. Russian conceptualism may be
considered an ironic imitation and inversion of the solip-
sistic activity of the collective supermind, which not only is
imprisoned by its allegiance to absolute ideas but turns
society itself into a prison or lunatic asylum. Conceptu-
alism, as it emerged in the West, remained a narrowly
artistic device and had a more limited scope, since its
substitution of concept for object proceeded from the
visual art’s need for deeper self-reﬂection, without the
implicit criticism of Western civilization as a whole. In
Russia, conceptualism revealed much broader philosoph-
ical and critical potential, because it addressed an abso-
lutely textualized and ideologized society and ironically
reproduced the hidden patterns of this ideologization.
1. Andrei Sinyavsky
If a complete history of Russian conceptualism and
postmodernism is ever written, then Andrei Siniavsky
(born 1925) will deﬁnitely stand as one of its founders.
Although Siniavsky himself does not use the term,
generally preferring to disassociate himself from any
established philosophical school, his writing has
persistently taken a postmodern perspective, particu-
larly as it tends to reinterpret classical models of
socialist realism in the spirit of post-Utopian soc-art, or
‘‘socialist art.’’2 As one commentator puts it, ‘‘Sinyavsky
3 ‘‘Emptiness is the contents of Pushkin. Without emptiness he would
have been incomplete.’’ Progulki s Pushkinym, in: Abram Tertz (Andrei
Siniavsky). Sobranie sochinenii v. 2 tomakh. Moscow, SP ‘‘Start’’, 1992, v. 1,
p. 373.
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system, inventing no new vocabulary. This places him in
the mainstream of the Russian tradition, in which
literature and philosophy are not, as a rule, entirely
differentiated’’ (Lourie, 1975 p. 122).
Siniavsky’s book, On Socialist Realism, published in
Paris in 1959, offers an original interpretation of this
artistic method, challenging both the ofﬁcial Soviet
valorization of socialist realism and its sceptical recep-
tion in the West. Siniavsky exposes the inner contra-
diction of the method, which attempts to join
a teleological element (socialism) with a scientiﬁc one
(realism). Socialist realism is logically inclined towards
classicism as an aesthetic model, with its orientation
toward sublime and idealistic norms of discourse. The
realistic component, which is alien to socialism, intro-
duces an involuntary element of parody into Soviet art.
‘‘It is impossible, without falling into parody, to produce
a positive hero in the style of full socialist realism and
yet make him into a psychological portrait. In this way,
we will get neither psychology nor hero’’ (Lourie, 1975
p. 92). Siniavsky himself would prefer both hero and
parody. He is not only sensitive enough to grasp the
inherently parodic element in socialist realism, but he
goes so far as to advise the self-conscious exploitation
of parody as an enhancement of Soviet heroic art. He
regrets that the eclectic mixture of realism and classi-
cism that was ofﬁcially promoted from the 1930s
through the 1950s lacks the genuinely phantasmagoric
proportions capable of transforming dull, didactic
imitations of life into inspirational imitations of didac-
ticism and teleology itself.
For example, Siniavsky proposes that Stalin’s death, if
presented as a religious event, could have generated
parodic effects and become a theme of great art. ‘‘We could
have announced on the radio that he did not die but had
risen to heaven, from which he continued to watch us, in
silence, no words emerging from beneath the mystic
mustache. His relics would have cured men struck by
paralysis or possessed by demons. And children, before
going to bed, would have kneeled by the window and
addressed their prayers to the cold and shining stars of the
Celestial Kremlin’’ (Lourie, 1975 p. 90). Such a trans-
formation of socialist realism into a religio-parodic form
was accomplished more than twenty years later in the
conceptualist works, or sots-art of Komar andMelamid. The
titles of many of their paintings – such as ‘‘Stalin and the
Muses’’ and ‘‘View of the Kremlin in a Romantic Landscape’’
(both from the series, ‘‘Nostalgic Socialist Realism’’, 1981–
1982) – suggest an implicit reference to Siniavsky’s meta-
socialist project.
Instead of condemning socialist realism as false, dema-
gogic, or simply bad art, as was routinely done at that time
in the West, or praising its truthful reﬂection of life, as in
the Soviet Union, Siniavsky eliminates the criterion of truth
altogether, reinterpreting this canon as a system of inter-
related signs which may be used for artistic purposes – not
because they refer to some knowable reality, but precisely
because they escape it. He was among the ﬁrst to formulate
the principle of parody and pastiche (conscious eclecticism)
as a new source for contemporary art and, he opened theway for a highly innovative postmodern assimilation of
socialist realism, which from the 1960s was generally
considered a dead-end movement both in the West and in
dissident circles within the USSR.
In later articles and in his book, Soviet Civilization (1988),
Siniavsky continues his investigation of communism as
a unique historical formationpossessing its ownunexplored,
mystical depth. As compared with other researchers in this
ﬁeld, Siniavsky stresses the theatrical nature of the Soviet
system, which was designed as a spectacle by the great
directors Lenin and, especially, Stalin (‘‘in his eyes hewas the
onlyactor–directoronthestageof all Russiaandall theworld.
In this sense, Stalin was a born artist’’ (Lourie, 1975 p. 98)).2. Metaphysics of emptiness and garbage: IlyaKabakov
Ilya Kabakov (born 1933) is one of the founders and
chief proponents of Russian conceptualism. He is the
author of many texts commenting on the contemporary
situation in art and on general principles of conceptualist
thinking.
Kabakov’s thought is remarkable in that it focuses
almost entirely on unique features of Soviet civilization and
interprets them as general philosophical categories. The
central category of his worldview might be called empti-
ness, or void, which he views as fundamental to Soviet
reality. The qualities of ‘‘emptiness’’ and ‘‘vampirism’’ that
Andrei Siniavsky identiﬁed in the national genius of Push-
kin,3 Kabakov ascribes to Russia itself, which he calls
a ‘‘hole in space, in the world, in the fabric of being.’’
Kabakov treats emptiness not merely as a lack of essential
positive forms, a space waiting to be ﬁlled and organized;
he presents the view that in Russia, unlikeWestern Europe,
emptiness is a principle of destruction and disorganization
which actively transforms all positive being into non-being.
‘‘By such ineradicable activeness, force and constancy,
emptiness ‘‘lives,’’ transforming being into its antithesis,
destroying construction, mystifying reality, turning all into
dust and emptiness. [.] Emptiness adheres to, merges
with, sucks being. Its mighty, adhesive, nauseating anti-
energy is taken from the transfer into itself, which like
vampirism, it gleans and extracts from the existence
surrounding it’’ (Kabakov, 1990 p. 54). If it is true that
nature does not tolerate a vacuum, then in Russia the rule is
inverted: a vacuum does not tolerate nature. One cannot
interrogate emptiness for its causes and goals because its
very nature is to annihilate such categories. ‘‘Why? What
was the purpose? This question can be put only to the
living, the intelligent, the natural, but not to emptiness.
Emptiness is the other, antithetical side of any question’’
(Kabakov, 1990 p. 54). Because such emptiness is active,
nothing can be erected in its midst without immediately
falling prey to a vampirism that drains its soul away. In
Kabakov’s view, this existence bordering on non-existence,
is characteristic of the entirety of Soviet civilization, whose
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being founded in the metaphysical void.
In such an environment, all constructions implicitly
contain their own undoing, giving rise to another important
concept in Kabakov’s thought, the ‘‘dump’’ or ‘‘garbage.’’
Garbage isametaphysical category, indicating thepresenceof
nothingness within material things; it represents something
that is simultaneously nothing.Moreover, every ‘‘something’’
is garbage-to-be. Although this fate is inevitable for every
object, its historic manifestation is especially palpable in the
Soviet Union. ‘‘.I feel thatman, living in our region, is simply
suffocating in his own life among the garbage since there is
nowhere to take it, nowhere to sweep itout–wehave lost the
border between garbage and non-garbage space. Everything
is covered up, littered with garbage – our homes, streets,
cities.Wehavenoplace todiscardall this– it remainsnearus’’
(Kabakov, 1989 pp. 45–46). Here the problem of garbage
disposal is metaphysical rather than logistical: it is not that
there is no dump, but that no space can be found that is not
a dump. There is no transcendental realmwhere the garbage
might bedisposed of (hell), orwhere a process of puriﬁcation
might originate (heaven).
For Kabakov, however, the meaning of garbage is
ambivalent. It is not just the negative aspect of physical
existence, but is the core of existence itself, since reality
reveals its transitoriness in the form of garbage. As the
material integrity of a thing deteriorates, its sentimental
value progressively grows. An object which loses its
functionality – becoming garbage – is preserved on the
level of pure meanings, in memory. Thus garbage is
intrinsically more ideal and spiritual than those brand-new
things that serve us by their material utility. On behalf of
one of his characters, ‘‘the man who never threw anything
away,’’ Kabakov writes: ‘‘.[S]trange as it seems, I feel that
it is precisely the garbage, that very dirt where important
papers and simple scraps are mixed and unsorted, that
comprises the genuine and only real fabric of my life, no
matter how ridiculous and absurd it seems from the
outside.’’4 When things disclose their transitoriness and
‘‘nothingness,’’ they also increase their value. Paradoxically,
the dump is not only the cemetery for deceased things, but
also the realm of their immortality, where they reveal their
ultimate essence and meaning.
Many of Kabakov’s exhibitions showcase items of
garbage accompanied by elaborately descriptive labels that
would seem more appropriate for objects of great esteem,
like personal mementoes of celebrated historical ﬁgures.
Kabakov’s metaphysical dump is an inverted museum
where the objects are of no great signiﬁcance, as in
conventional exhibitions, but rather the most miserable
and negligible items from someone’s personal life – such as
a spent match, a shrivelled apple core, an old receipt, or
a pencil with a broken tip. A metaphysical tension arises
from the relationship between the negligible materiality of
these objects and their monumental verbal presentations.4 Kabakov (1989 p. 44). Compare with Alexander Zinoviev’s assess-
ment of a dump: ‘‘Love your dump., since it is your house, and you have
and will have no other house.’’ (Zhivi. Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1989, p.
17)The relationship between reality and language is
a crucial point in Kabakov’s philosophy which concentrates
on the peculiar Russian logocentrism, the love for verbal
expression which remains strikingly indifferent to the
world of objects. ‘‘Language is a fundamental principle, an
aspect of thought; the world of the dump plunges it into
a new state where the word is separate from the thought,
the title separate from the object; the text is separate from
its meaning, the appellation is separate from that which it
names; in general, every word is divorced from its signiﬁ-
cation.’’5 Given that Russia is the zone of active emptiness,
which imbues everything with nothingness, the activity of
language is the only thing that remains real, or to use Jean
Baudrillard’s term, ‘‘hyperreal,’’ since it creates an illusory
reality of signiﬁcations without signiﬁeds. Kabakov
explores the language of such classical Russian authors as
Gogol, Dostoevsky, and Chekhov, identifying them as
predecessors of typical Soviet intoxication with words,
phantasmagoric verbosity inherent in ideocratic society. In
the characteristic propensity of these classics for excessive,
self-referential speech Kabakov reveals a total loss of any
object of communication. ‘‘But one must talk, speak out,
speak again and again. And therein lies the reason for the
neurosis in our great literature, in the minds and nerves
and memories of each one of us – the neurosis of incessant
talk, the preference for verbal self-realization, for the
incessant, unﬂagging, raging sea of words.’’6
These comments may remind us of Mikhail Bakhtin’s
valorization of dialogic language, but Kabakov offers
a much less sympathetic interpretation of the same
phenomenon. For Bakhtin, the dialogic relationship is the
only genuine mode of human existence: addressing the
other through language. For Kabakov, this obsession with
dialogue bears witness to the lack of any relationship
between words and a corresponding reality. People are
eager to immerse themselves in verbal communication
because they seek to keep nothingness at bay with magical
incantations. But the very abundance of their chatter
betrays the presence of nothingness all around them and
intensiﬁes their verbal neurosis. Bakhtin admires themulti-
referentiality in the speech of Dostoevsky’s characters,
whose conversations play off of earlier conversations,
themselves thickly imbedded with dialogic references.
Kabakov sees this inclination for verbosity as a symptom of
Russian’s fear of emptiness and the implicit realization of
its ubiquity. The speech of literary characters can only refer
to other speech, because there is no reality beyond their
words except for the void they try to drown out with their
voices – a void that is only emphasized and augmented by
the emptiness of their conversations.
Kabakov’s analysis shows how Bakhtin’s dialogical
theory can be interpreted in a broader, conceptualist
paradigm. For Bakhtin, to exist authentically means to
communicate dialogically, which allows us to interpret5 On the Subject of the Local Language, in: Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh.
Das Leben der Fliegen. Life of Flies. Kolnischer Kunstverein. Edition Cantz,
1992, p. 239.
6 Epistemological Thirst, Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das Leben der
Fliegen. Life of Flies. p. 242.
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transcendence of human loneliness, alienation and objec-
tiﬁcation. Kabakov advances a postmodern perspective on
this dialogical Utopia, revealing the illusory character of
a paradise of communication by showing that its language
is only a self-referential miasma emanating from and
covering over reality’s emptiness. Bakhtin’s attempt to
overcome monological solipsism is characteristic of an
existentialist gesture of ﬂight from objectivity, which
inevitably falls into the even more absurd solipsism of
dialogue enclosed in itself. For monologic subjectivity,
there still remains the world of external objects, whereas
for dialogic intersubjectivity which assimilates everything
into the process of communication, remains nothing real
except for words and their meanings.
A large part of Kabakov’s work is dedicated to theorizing
the phenomenon of Soviet totalitarianism. Arguing that the
‘‘rupture between word and meaning creates an empty
space in which lives and thrives something that can be
termed ‘total ideology’,’’7 he identiﬁes a peculiar ontological/
linguistic premise for the dictatorship of ideas in recent
Russian history. When there is no reality to which language
can refer, language itself runs the danger of substituting for
reality. Like God creating the universe from nothing by the
force of the Word, ideology has the power to create a reality
out of language only because it proceeds from nothingness.
‘‘The word, which has been cut off from and thrown out of
the nest which was its meaning, can now signify anything,
depending on the direction of the ideological wind. In
practice this means that a whole world of substituted
meanings comes into existence.’’8 Ideology itself, in Kaba-
kov’s terms, may be deﬁned as the illusion of reality
produced by language in the absence of reality as such. This
accounts for the grandiose enterprises and construction
projects of the Soviet era that proceeded not from an
economic basis but from abstract concepts and ideological
assumptions, which ultimately led to phantasmagoric and
utterly ineffective results. From this standpoint, ideology is
linguocracy, the capacity of language to produce and impose
on others a pseudo-reality that claims to be uniquely valid.
Strikingly, Kabakov deﬁnes conceptualism itself in
nearly the same terms as he uses to describe ideology.
First of all, he is careful to distinguish ideologically
oriented Russian conceptualism from the aforementioned
Western school of the same name, whose principle is ‘‘the
idea instead of thing,’’ or ‘‘one thing instead of another’’;
for example, the textual representation of a chair takes
the place of its visual counterpart. The principle of
Russian conceptualism might be phrased as ‘‘the idea
instead of no thing,’’ since the reality to which Western
conceptual representations refer does not exist in Russia.
Both principles operate by substitution, but while
Western signs eventually refer back to reality, Russian
signiﬁcation borders only on emptiness. ‘‘This contiguity,
closeness, touchingness, contact with nothing, emptiness,7 On the Subject of the Local Language, Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das
Leben der Fliegen. Life of Flies. p. 240.
8 On the Subject of the Local Language, Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das
Leben der Fliegen. Life of Flies. p. 240.makes up, we feel, the basic peculiarity of ‘Russian
conceptualism.’’’9
Conceptualism, then, shares with ideology a tendency to
substitute signs or concepts for real substance. But the
principal difference between them is that ideology claims
its signs have real referents, while conceptualism reveals
the emptiness of its own signs. Ideology conceals its own
contingency, pretending to integrate signs with reality in
such a way as to declare itself ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘all-embracing.’’
Conceptualism exposes this ‘‘realistic fallacy,’’ discloses the
contingency of all concepts and refuses to ground itself in
any reality. ‘‘Precisely because of its self-referentiality and
the lack of windows or away out to something else, it is like
something that hangs in the air, a self-reliant thing, like
a fantastic construction, connected to nothing, with its
roots in nothing.’’10 Conceptualism emerged organically in
the Soviet milieu precisely because it is the underside of
total ideology. The reality presented by Soviet ideology
existed as an elaborate façade, a huge and expensive movie
set, and conceptualism invites us to walk behind the
scenes, to recognize the spectral and absurd side of this
monumental construction. Whereas totalitarianism must
found itself in a monistic metaphysics of ideas that become
real, conceptualism offers a series of imaginary meta-
physics, which in their interplay demonstrate the relativity
of each and undermine any metaphysical pretensions.
The proliferation of metaphysic systems within
conceptualism is conceived as a way to overcome the
metaphysical dimension of discourse, not by the means of
serious analytical criticism (as in Wittgenstein or Derrida),
but through the self-ironic, self-parodic construction of
systems that deliberately disclose their own contingency.
Traditionally, metaphysics bases all of reality on some
general presupposition, a concept so broad as to allow all
phenomena to be deduced from it. The Idea in Plato’s
system, Absolute Spirit in Hegel, Matter and Economic
Production in Marx, Will in Schopenhauer, Life in Nietz-
sche, Creative Impetus in Bergson, Being in Heidegger are
examples of such grand philosophical constructions. But if
we recognize, as conceptualism does, that all of these are
merely concepts, that none has a privileged claim to the
real, then any concept we might choose becomes equally
efﬁcient for the production of an imaginary metaphysics.
Hence Kabakov intentionally chooses small and trivial
objects as foundations for metaphysical discourse in order
to suggest a conceptualist alternative to the grand schemes
of traditional metaphysics.
One of Kabakov’s most developed examples proceeds
from the ordinary houseﬂy, which acquires in his work the
same status as, for instance, Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. ‘‘The
work presented here, the treatise ‘The Fly with Wings’
almost visually demonstrates the nature of all philosophical
discourse – at its base may lie a simple, uncomplicated and
even nonsensical object – an ordinary ﬂy, for example. But
yet the very quality of the discourse does not suffer in the9 Conceptualism in Russia, Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das Leben der
Fliegen. Life of Flies. p. 247.
10 Conceptualism in Russia, Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das Leben der
Fliegen. Life of Flies. p. 249.
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illustrated) that the idea of philosophizing and its goal
consists not at all in the revelation of the original supposi-
tion (if this can turn out to be an ordinary ﬂy), but rather in
the very process of discourse, in the verbal frivolity itself, in
the mutual suppositions of the beginnings and ends, in the
ﬂow of connections and representations of that very
thing.’’11 Besides demonstrating the contingency of meta-
physical systems, Kabakov accomplishes two other closely
related philosophical tasks. By contrasting the superﬁciality
of the topicwith thegravityof his chosengenre, Kabakovnot
only deconstructs the methodology of serious philosophy,
but elevates the trivial to the status of a topic worthy of
philosophical meditation. Instead of promoting abstract
concepts, Kabakovargues themerits of so humble a creature
as the houseﬂy as a principle of explanation of such impor-
tant spheres as economics, politics, arts and civilization. The
same device that allows him to deconstruct traditional
philosophy, also serves to construct a new range of philos-
ophies that can assimilate the words and concepts of ordi-
nary language in all its inﬁnite richness. This pan-
philosophical approach can also be applied to such concepts
as chair or table or wall, identifying them as potential
universals that may provide a more vivid elucidation of the
world than such traditional concepts as Life or Being.
Although Kabakov selects concrete universals that are
much narrower in scope than traditional abstract founding
concepts, such as Truth or Spirit, their speciﬁcity imparts an
informational value that is lacking in the vagueness of more
general terms. Thus Kabakov’s metaphysics of the ﬂy appear
to be more informative than the traditional all-inclusive
metaphysics of Life or Spirit. In his commentary on Kaba-
kov’s installation, ‘‘The Fly with Wings,’’ which contains the
treatise ‘‘The Fly as a Subject and Basis for Philosophical
Discourse,’’ Boris Groys, another conceptualist thinker,
writes: ‘‘Our culture contains a small stock of words that
lack a clear, ﬁrmly deﬁned meaning. These words are, in
a way, linguistic jokers which, without meaning anything in
particular, are thereby able to mean practically anything.
Speciﬁcally, they include ‘being,’ ‘life,’ and ‘thought.’ These
words mean simultaneously everything and nothing – and
are equally applicable to anything at all. For this reason they
have traditionally enjoyed great prestige in culture. Kabakov
transforms the word ‘ﬂy’ into another of these joker-words
which are potentially applicable to anything what-
soever.In the ability of an ephemeral word bereft of
a noble philosophical tradition to achieve the lofty status of
thewordswhich possess this traditionwemay see a historic
opportunity which is also open to the ﬂy – the opportunity
to construct a ﬂy-paradise of its own, its own world of
platonic, ﬂy-essences.’’12 Thus Kabakov’s multiple meta-
physics presuppose the simultaneous double movement of
a concept. An ordinary concept – like that of a ﬂy – assumes
metaphysical status, while metaphysical discourse is
reduced to the genre of a speech game.11 The Fly as a Subject and Basis for Philosophical Discourse. Introduc-
tion. In: Zhizn’ mukh. Das Leben der Fliegen. Life of Flies. p. 224.
12 Boris Groys. We Shall Be Like Flies, Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das
Leben der Fliegen. Life of Flies. pp. 212–213.Kabakov’s general project brings philosophy out of its
narrow discursive domain into the realm of ordinary
speech and artistic creation. By broadening the deﬁnition of
philosophy, Kabakov, more than any other contemporary
thinker, responds to the uniquely Russian mode of philos-
ophizing, which is not so much abstract thinking about the
world as it is a concrete implementation of concepts in
everyday life. Kabakov demonstrates the absurdity of an
existence that submits completely to ideological designs.
Conceptualism simultaneously discloses the contingent
character of concepts and the conceptual character of
reality. Kabakov had a powerful inﬂuence on many Russian
artists, critics, and thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s, who
continue to develop conceptual models derived from the
historical tradition of Russia. ‘‘.[O]ur local thinking, from
the very beginning in fact, could have been called
‘conceptualism’.’’133. The morality of eclecticism: Vitaly Komar and
Alexander Melamid
Vitaly Komar (born 1943) and Alexander Melamid (born
1945) are the founders of ‘‘soc-art’’ (1972), a style related
through nostalgia and parody to the ofﬁcial canon of Soviet
art. Komar and Melamid’s own work is not limited to soc-
art but proceeds from the diversity of ideological and
mythological codes peculiar to both Russian and American
‘‘postcommunist’’ and ‘‘postmodern’’ societies. Like Ilya
Kabakov, these artists supplement their visual work with
programmatic discourse, proposing that certain ideas can
function as self-sufﬁcient works of art. What is it that
distinguishes the idea-as-art from the idea as an element of
ideological or philosophical system? Paradoxically, the art-
idea is more quintessentially ideal than the idea imbedded
in theoretical discourse, because it does not claim to
transform reality as in ideology or to explain reality as in
philosophy. Rather than weave itself into a tapestry of
justiﬁcation, clariﬁcation, argumentation, the art-idea
presents itself purely as idea, idea as such. For the same
reason, conceptualism establishes the concept as its basic
unit, one that refers only to itself and not to external
referent.
Komar and Melamid are sympathetic to Kierkegaard
and Schlegel’s discussions of self-irony as the moving force
of philosophical wisdom and religious ascension. By taking
such a position, a conceptualist may interpret even the
most ostensibly serious philosophical and theological
systems as implicitly ironical. Following the soc-artistic
mode of reasoning, Komar and Melamid reinterpret in
terms of ironic nostalgia not only the Soviet ideocracy, but
what they consider to be the ﬁrst monuments of commu-
nist thought, Plato’s Republic and Laws. To the heated
debate regarding the proto-totalitarian nature of Plato’s
idealism, Komar and Melamid bring an unexpected twist:
was not Plato joking? Referring to the conclusion of The
Republic, they write:13 Conceptualism in Russia, in: Ilya Kabakov. Zhizn’ mukh. Das Leben der
Fliegen. Life of Flies, p. 249.
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asleep is that one and the same person should be able to
write both comedies and tragedies and that the person
who writes tragedies well will thus be a comedy-writer as
well. Plato’s remark compels one to suspect that his
ideal state is the ﬁrst anti-Utopia, a parody whose key
has been lost in the darkness of the ages. One cannot
help but sense a Socratic irony in the following
contention of the ‘‘comedy-writers’’: ‘We are even the
creators of the most beautiful tragedy, if not possibly the
very best. For our entire state system offers a reproduc-
tion of the most beautiful and best life; we contend that
this is precisely what is the most veritable tragedy.’
(Laws, 817B).’’14
Thus the entire conceptualist model extends itself to the
very roots of those ideals and Utopias that inspired the
formation of subsequent Western civilization. It is
a commonly held opinion that the Soviet implementations
of Marxist ideology distorted the purity of the communist
project, engendering a farcical realization of Marx’s vision.
But what if the farce preceded the vision? That is to say,
what if the very concept of Utopia, as promulgated by Plato,
was originally conceived as a joke, as an anti-Utopian
fantasy? Then we could say that what became ‘‘Utopia’’ is
the distortion of a primordial parody, a kind of anti-parody
which approached in all seriousness what was meant to be
taken as humor. Thus the Soviet implementation of Marx’s
vision might well be understood as the perfect realization14 Vitaly Komar & Aleksandr Melamid. Death Poems. Manifesto of
Eclecticism. [New York]: Galerie Barbara Farber,1988, p.111.of a misinterpretation – a joke that posterity failed to get.
Komar and Melamid’s theory reverses the entire retro-
spective of Western civilization and, though it probably
cannot be validated, at least bears witness to the potential
scope of ironic reversals inherent in the conceptualist way
of thinking.
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